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1. Introduction
The newspaper market is a typical example of a so-called two-sided market as the demand for
advertisements in a newspaper depends positively on its circulation (Anderson and Gabszewicz,
2008). In such situations, there is a wealth of open questions for competition policy, for example
how a proposed merger between two such platforms should be evaluated. This is because the
policy conclusions that are drawn from theoretical models do not only depend on own- and
cross-price elasticities of demand on both sides of the market, but also on the own- and cross-
elasticities of demand on one side with respect to demand on the other side. For example, in
the newspaper market, when considering to increase the subscription price, newspapers will
take into account that such an increase not only has a negative effect on subscription revenues
through its negative effect on circulation, but also a negative effect on advertising revenues
through decreased circulation. Hence, it is important to know how, in equilibrium, advertisers’
demand for slots in a newspaper reacts to an increase in the circulation of that newspaper and of
other newspapers, in addition to how readers’ demand for a newspaper depends on advertising
in that newspaper and in other newspapers.
In this paper, we develop a structural econometric framework that allows us to assess the
effects of mergers among two-sided platforms selling differentiated products on prices and wel-
fare. Our structural model encompasses demands for differentiated products on both sides of the
market and profit maximization by competing oligopolistic publishers who choose subscription
and advertising prices, while taking the interactions between the two sides of the market into
account. We discuss different ways in which such a merger can be assessed and then implement
the proposed methods for a hypothetical merger among two Dutch newspaper companies.
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) use a similar framework to test for collusion in the Italian
newspaper market when readership demand does not depend on the amount of advertising. In
this paper, we not only address another competition policy issue, namely merger assessment, but
also extend their framework to the more general case of a two-sided market with two network
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effects. In this case, not only advertising demand depends on the number of readers but also
readership demand depends on the amount of advertising in the newspaper.1 In particular, we
specify demand on each side of the market to be given by a logit model. We show how marginal
costs can be recovered and how a merger can be assessed by either performing a SSNIP test or
solving for the new equilibrium following a hypothetical merger.2
Theoretical work on mergers among two-sided platforms is very scarce. Chandra and
Collard-Wexler (2009) present an economic model of the newspaper market which shows that
it is not necessarily the case that a monopolist will choose to set higher prices than competing
duopolists on either side of the platform. A recent paper by Leonello (2010) analyses mergers
in a similar setting. Her model also has differentiated products a` la Hotelling on both sides of
the market and two oligopolistic platforms merging into a monopoly. She finds that, even in the
absence of efficiency gains, because of the existence of indirect network externalities, merging
platforms have the incentive to keep their prices low after the merger at least on one side of the
market.
Empirical work on mergers involving two-sided platforms is also scarce. Evans and Noel
(2008) point out that, as the Lerner pricing formula does not hold in such markets, traditional
merger simulation models are wrongly specified if applied without modifications to two-sided
or multi-sided platforms. They also perform an analysis of the merger between Google and
DoubleClick (the first empirical analysis in the literature of a merger in a two-sided industry).
They show that relying on conventional methods would have led to significantly different results
than using methods that explicitly incorporate the two-sided nature of this market. Nevertheless,
they only perform a calibration exercise due to lack of data.
Also Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) assess mergers in the Canadian newspaper mar-
ket, but their analysis is mainly an ex-post merger evaluation exercise; they use a two-sided
1Previous studies show that it may or may not be necessary to consider this case (Sonnac, 2000). For instance,
whereas Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) find no effect of advertising on the number of readers of daily newspa-
pers in Italy and Fan (2010) reaches the same conclusion for US daily newspapers, Kaiser and Wright (2006) and
Kaiser and Song (2009) find that advertising increases readers demand for magazines in Germany.
2SSNIP stands for “Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price”, see below.
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Hotelling model to explain their finding that greater concentration did not lead to higher prices
neither for readers nor to advertisers; yet they do not build and estimate a structural econometric
model; their framework therefore, cannot be used to simulate mergers.
The closest paper to ours is Fan (2010). While devoid of a competition policy objective and
not referring at all to the two-sided markets literature, she presents a structural model of demand
for newspapers which she uses to assess ex-post some mergers among US newspapers. Whereas
our framework to analyse merger effects on prices is more general than hers, her model would
allow to account for changes in the quality of the newspapers after the merger, provided data on
quality are indeed available.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 and 3, we present the model and our approach
to merger assessment. We provide information on the data and background information on
the market for Dutch daily newspapers in Section 4 and 5, respectively, present our demand
estimates in Section 6, and perform an example of a merger simulation in Section 7. Section 8
concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Readership and advertising demand
Key inputs into the economic analysis are estimates of the responsiveness of readership de-
mand with respect to newspaper prices and the advertising intensity, and the responsiveness of
advertising demand with respect to advertising prices and the number of readers of a newspa-
per. In this section, we discuss how demand and marginal costs can be estimated using market
level data. As circulation data for free newspapers are only available at the national level we
obtain our main results using national level data with a Berry (1994)-type multinomial logit
specification and then compare parts of them to results obtained using regional level data.
For readership demand for daily newspapers we assume that each consumer buys at most
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one newspaper. The utility from buying a newspaper depends, among other things, on the price
of that newspaper and the percentage advertising in that newspaper. Formally, the utility of
consumer i from buying newspaper j in t is given by3
uni jt=αp
n
jt+βq
a
jt+ξ
n
jt+ε
n
i jt.
Throughout, the superscript “n” stands for “newspaper” (as in utility derived by readers of that
newspaper or price of that newspaper) and the superscript “a” stands for “advertisement” (as
in utility of placing a particular advertisement or the price of an advertisement). In the above
utility function, αpnjt+βqajt is the part of the utility that stems from the two observed character-
istics price, pnjt, and advertising, qajt. ξnjt is the part of the utility that stems from unobserved
characteristics, and finally εni jt is the part of the utility derived from buying newspaper j that
is specific to individual i at time t. We assume that εni jt is distributed according to the type I
extreme value distribution independently across j and t and introduce the outside good j = 0,
buying no newspaper, that yields average utility 0, i.e. uni0t=ε0t.
To determine the market shares we need to define the potential market size, which we will
denote by Mn. We assume that the hypothetical market size for readership demand is the popu-
lation, i.e. we assume that every individual buys at most one newspaper.
Define the vectors pnt , qat and ξnt , which contain the prices, amounts of advertising, and
unobserved characteristics of all newspapers, respectively. We assume that consumers buy the
one newspaper, or none, that yields the highest utility. Then, we have that the probability that
newspaper j is chosen is
(1) Pr
(
n = j
∣∣∣ pnt , qat , ξnt
)
=
exp
(
αpnjt+βq
a
jt+ξ
n
jt
)
1+
∑J
l=1 exp
(
αpnlt+βq
a
lt+ξ
n
lt
) .
3Sometimes, utility is stated as depending on a choice-specific constant. Here, the mean of ξnjt over time, later
denoted as αnj , serves the same purpose.
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Likewise, for the outside good we have
Pr
(
n = 0
∣∣∣ pnt , qat , ξnt
)
=
1
1+
∑J
l=1 exp
(
αpnlt+βq
a
lt+ξ
n
lt
) .
Notice that all of the above is still formulated on the individual level. However, the probability
to buy newspaper j at time t is equal to the observed market share of that product, which we
will denote by snjt. The market share for the outside good is denoted by sn0t. Using a well-known
result of Berry (1994), we then have that
(2) ln
(
snjt
)
−ln
(
sn0t
)
=αpnjt+βq
a
jt+ξ
n
jt,
i.e., the difference between the natural logarithm of the market share of good j and the natural
logarithm of the market share of the outside good is equal to the utility from observed char-
acteristics pnjt, qajt, and the unobserved characteristic ξnjt. Importantly, the left hand side of this
equation is observed because s j and s0 are observed.4
We assume that
ξnjt=α
n
j+α
n
t ,
which means that there is a newspaper fixed effect αnj and a time fixed effect αnt . Under this
assumption, we can estimate α and β by regressing ln
(
snjt
)
−ln
(
sn0t
)
on pnjt and anjt once we use
the within-group estimator, where the observational unit is a newspaper, and additionally control
for time fixed effects that are the same across all newspapers. This is a suitable procedure to
control for endogeneity of prices if the endogeneity arises due to unobserved differences across
newspapers that stay the same over time.
Now, having obtained estimates of α and β, using the observed market shares, we can cal-
4In our data, some of the explanatory variables are not available for all newspapers. In order to make as much
use as possible from the available data, we calculate the market shares snjt before dropping observations with
missing information on observable newspaper characteristics because otherwise the log-difference on the left hand
side of the estimation equation is mismeasured.
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culate the responsiveness of readership demand with respect to own prices,
∂snjt
∂pnjt
=snjt
(
1−snjt
)
α,
prices of other newspapers,
∂snjt
∂pnkt
= −snjt s
n
ktα,
own advertising,
∂snjt
∂qajt
=snjt
(
1−snjt
)
β,
and advertising in other newspapers,
∂snjt
∂qakt
= −snjt s
n
ktβ.
We proceed analogously for advertising demand. Here, the utility from placing ad i into
newspaper j at time t is
uai jt=γp
a
jt+δq
n
jt+ξ
a
jt+ε
a
i jt.
The market size Ma is the total amount of advertising in all print media. The characteristics are
the price of advertising, pajt, and the number of readers, qnjt. We also assume that εai jt follows a
type I extreme value distribution and that
ξajt=α
a
j+α
a
t .
Then, we can estimate γ and δ by regressing ln
(
sajt
)
−ln
(
sa0t
)
on pajt and qnjt using the within-
group estimator once we also control for time fixed effects. Finally, as we have done for read-
ership demand we can calculate the responsiveness of advertising demand with respect to own
prices, ∂sajt/∂pajt, prices of other newspapers, ∂sajt/∂pakt, own readership, ∂sajt/∂qnjt, and reader-
ship of other newspapers, ∂sajt/∂qnkt.
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2.2. Markups and marginal costs
Towards recovering marginal costs we assume that firms f maximize profits by choosing adver-
tising prices pajt and subscription prices pnjt for all newspapers j in their newspaper portfolio F f .
Assuming constant marginal costs for simplicity, mcajt and mcnjt, their profit function for variable
profits is5
Π f t=
∑
l∈F f
{(
palt−mc
a
lt
)
Mat s
a
lt+
(
pnlt−mc
n
lt
)
Mnsnlt
}
.
The first term are advertising profits from newspaper l. They are given by the mark-up times
the advertising quantity, which itself is given by the market size times the market share. The
market share is equal to the analogue of (1) for advertising demand. It therefore depends on the
vector of all advertising prices, pat , and the vector of all readership demands, denoted by qnt .
Similarly, the second term are readership profits. The number of readers is given by the
market share in the subscriptions market, which itself depends on the vector of all subscription
prices, pnt , and all advertising quantities, qat .
Assuming the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices with strictly positive
prices we have that the prices pajt and pnjt satisfy the first-order conditions
∂Π f t
∂pajt
= 0
and
∂Π f t
∂pnjt
= 0.
It is important at this point to realize that we have
qnt =Mnt snt
(
pnt , q
a
t
)
5We assume throughout that F f does not change over time. Then, fixed costs are irrelevant to the firm’s
maximization problem.
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and
qat =M
a
t s
a
t
(
pat , q
n
t
)
.
This is a nonlinear system of 2J equations with 2J unknowns, and therefore we cannot obtain
the first-order conditions by simply substituting the equations above into the profit functions
and calculating first derivatives. However, we show in Appendix A that we can instead use the
implicit function theorem to obtain the first-order conditions.
In the empirical analysis, we can take another approach because readership demand does
not depend on the advertising quantity, as in Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007). Then, using
∂qajt
∂pakt
=Ma ·
∂sajt
∂pakt
and
∂qnjt
∂pnkt
=Mn ·
∂snjt
∂pnkt
.
we have the first-order conditions
(3) Masajt+
∑
l∈F f

(
palt−mc
a
lt
)
Ma
∂salt
∂pajt
= 0
and
(4) Mnsnjt+
∑
l∈F f

(
pnlt−mc
n
lt
)
Mn
∂snlt
∂pnjt
+
∑
k
(
palt−mc
a
lt
)
Ma
∂salt
∂qnkt
· Mn ·
∂snkt
∂pnjt
= 0
for j = 1, . . . , J . These are obtained as derivatives of the profit function with respect to the
prices.
Generally, a marginal price increase has three effects. The first effect is that profits increase
because the margin increases. This effect is associated with the term Masajt in (3), and Mnsnjt in
(4). Secondly, a price increase, say for advertising in newspaper j, affects advertising demand
for all newspapers because a particular advertisement is placed in only one newspaper, or in
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none. This effect is associated with the term (palt−mcalt)Ma∂salt/∂pajt , representing the mark-up
times the effect of the price change on the advertising quantity Masalt for newspaper l. This
effect is taken into account by the firm for all newspapers it owns, hence we sum over l ∈ F f .
A similar argument holds for a change in the subscription price.
Finally, there are network effects that define the two-sidedness of the market. In gen-
eral, a price increase affects subscription revenues because it affects advertising demand, and
readership demand depends on the amount of adverting in the newspaper. Here, consistent
with our empirical findings, we assume that this network effect is not present. However,
we allow advertising demand to depend on readership so that a subscription price increase
will affect advertising demand in all newspapers, denoted as k, and not only on the ones
that are owned by the firm. This will in turn have an effect on advertising revenues. So,
∑
k (palt−mcalt)Ma(∂salt/∂qnkt) · Mn · (∂snkt/∂pnjt) is the effect of a change in pnjt on advertising profits
in newspaper l. To obtain the effect on firm profits we sum over l ∈ F f .
There are J newspapers and two prices for each newspaper. Hence, there are 2J first-order
conditions with 2J unknown variables, namely the marginal costs of an advertisement and the
marginal cost of producing and delivering a newspaper copy. It is convenient to express this
system of equations in a compact way.
For this, we define the following J × J matrices. A Nevo (2001)-type ownership matrix
Ω∗, a matrix of marginal effects of advertising prices on advertising demand S a, a matrix of
marginal effects of subscription prices on newspaper demand S n, a matrix of network effects,
Nn, and interactions between those matrices and the ownership matrix, ΩS a , ΩS n , and ΩNa . In
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particular, let Ω∗jr= 1 if products j and r are owned by the same firm, 0 otherwise, and
S ajr =
∂sart
∂pajt
,
ΩS
a
jr = Ω
∗
jr · S ajr
S njr =
∂snrt
∂pnjt
,
ΩS
n
jr = Ω
∗
jr · S njr
Najr =
∑
k
∂sart
∂qnkt
·
∂snkt
∂pnjt
ΩN
a
jr = Ω
∗
jr · Najr.
Then, we can express the set of first-order conditions as
sat +Ω
S a (pat −mcat )= 0
and
snt +Ω
S n (pnt −mcnt )+MaΩNa (pat −mcat )= 0,
where sat , snt , pat , pnt , mcat , and mcnt are now all J×1 vectors of market shares, prices, and marginal
costs for advertisements and newspaper copies, respectively.
To solve this system of equations for the unknown (pat −mcat ) and (pnt −mcnt ) we define
Ω=

ΩS
a 0
ΩS
n MaΩNa
 ,
st=

sat
snt

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and
(pt−mct)=

pat −mcat
pnt −mcnt
 .
Using this we can write the first-order conditions as
st+Ω · (pt−mct)= 0
and solve for
(pt−mct)= −Ω−1st,
which shows that it is possible to recover an estimate of the mark-ups based on additional
appropriate assumptions on firms’ behaviour in the market, from the observed market shares,
the ownership structure and the estimated parameters of demand.
Using these estimated mark-ups one can then obtain marginal costs by subtracting the esti-
mated mark-ups from the observed prices, as
mct= pt− (pt−mct) .
3. Assessing unilateral merger effects in a two-sided market
This section discusses whether and how one should perform merger simulation in a two-sided
market. From the point of view of economics, the correct way to evaluate whether a merger is
likely to lead to higher prices would be to specify a model of the market in question, estimate
demand in order to recover values for the parameters of the model and then use the models and
the estimated parameters to predict the price chosen by the firms after the merger. One can then
compare the prices, consumer surplus and/or total welfare in the new equilibrium with those in
the old equilibrium. We conduct such an exercise below.
However, all this can often be very time consuming. As a result, in practice a full simulation
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is often not performed. In fact, it is often the case that a similar exercise to the SSNIP test
or the HM test, which were originally designed to define the relevant market, is performed.6
The idea is to measure the likelihood of a substantial non transitory increase in price by the
merging parties. Practitioners therefore simulate a given price increase above the current level
by the merging parties, assuming rivals do not change their prices and check whether that price
increase is profitable or not. If it is profitable, it is judged to be likely to take place.
In order to compare our full simulation results we also conduct such an exercise below. In
doing that we use the extension of the SSNIP test to two-sided markets developed in Filistrucchi
(2008) for market definition.7 The test is modified in such a way as to take into account the
presence of the indirect network effects in order to correctly assess the competitive constraints
faced by the merged firm and therefore the profitability of a price increase. So that for instance
in assessing whether an increase in the cover price of a newspaper leads to a loss in profits one
takes into account that not only a higher cover price will lead to lower demand from readers but
also a lower readership will lead to lower demand and profits from advertisers. Indeed, as we
will see, positive indirect network effects between the different sides of the platform reduce the
profitability of any price increase. In addition we allow the merged firm to optimally adjust the
price on the advertising side when the cover price is raised. As a result the only difference with
respect to the full merger simulation above is not allowing rivals to react to the price increase.8
6In the EU the test used in market definition is the ”Small Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price” (SSNIP)
test, in the US it is called the ”Hypothetical Monopolist” (HM) test The one just described above is the test in the
EU. In the US one is supposed to calculate the optimal price increase above the current level by the merging
parties keeping rivals’ prices constant. As in the case of market definition, the difference between the SSNIP and
the HM test appears to be very small at first sight and it is a matter of debate whether this difference is in practice
relevant or not. In practice, both in the EU and in the US, the test is conducted using formulas derived under the
assumption of constant marginal costs and either linear or iso-elastic demand. See Tilec and Howrey (2010) for
further discussion.
7For an application of the SSNIP test for two-sided markets to the daily newspapers market in Italy, see Argen-
tesi and Filistrucchi (2010).
8A further simplification could have been not to allow the merged firm to optimally adjust the price structure.
Then the profitability of the rise in prices would be lower, as any adjustment will tend to reduce the loss in profits
due to the increase in prices.
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3.1. SSNIP Test
The SSNIP test determines whether an increase of the subscription prices by the merging parties
of 5% is profitable. In order to assess this, we need to determine optimal advertising prices as
a function of subscription prices. The associated first-order condition for firm f is, as stated
already above,9 are
Masajt+
∑
l∈F ′f

(
palt−mc
a
lt
)
Ma
∂salt
∂pajt
= 0.
Notice that the set of products of the merged firm is F ′f , instead of F f before. Importantly, sajt
depends on qn=Mnsnt
(
pnt , qat
)
, which will change due to the increase in the subscription price.
We have shown above that ∂saj′ t/∂p
a
jt depends on sat
(
pat , qnt
)
, and hence on snt
(
pnt , qat
)
.
Observe that we have, by (2),
ˆξajt=ln
(
sajt
)
−ln
(
sa0t
)
−γˆpajt−ˆδq
n
jt
and
ˆξnjt=ln
(
snjt
)
−ln (sn0t) −αpnjt − βqajt,
which are expressed in terms of the observed market shares, prices, and quantities and where
estimated quantities are denoted by hats. Having obtained those we can calculate market shares
using the logit formulas
snt
(
pnt
)
=
exp
(
αˆpnjt+ ˆξ
n
jt
)
1+
∑J
l=1 exp
(
αˆpnlt+ ˆξ
n
lt
)
for the readership side, now already imposing β= 0, and
sat
(
pat , q
n
t
)
, =
exp
(
γˆpajt+ˆδq
n
jt+ ˆξ
a
jt
)
1+
∑J
l=1 exp
(
γˆpalt+ˆδq
n
lt+
ˆξalt
)
for the advertising side.
9Recall that this is for the case in which readership demand does not depend on the advertising quantity.
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This shows that we can solve the first-order conditions for the adjusted prices pa∗jt using the
estimates of the marginal costs that were obtained before. In the logic of the SSNIP test this is
done only for the merging parties using the adjusted ownership matrix. These prices, together
with the new quantities and the new subscription prices, are then used to calculate the change
in profits. Notice that here we do not solve for the new equilibrium because in the logic of the
SSNIP test in the logic of the SSNIP test we exogenously rise the subscription prices of the
merging parties by 5%, while keeping the other prices constant.
3.2. Full simulation and welfare analysis
For a full welfare analysis we need to solve the 2J first-order conditions for the new optimal
subscription prices after the parties have merged. From these first-order conditions we have
pPMt = −Ω
−1
(
pPMt
)
s
t
(pPMt ) + mct.
Note that in this case both the matrix Ω and the market shares st are those corresponding to
the optimal post-merger prices pPMt . It is generally difficult to solve analytically for the optimal
post merger prices as a function of estimated parameters. However, we can solve for them
numerically.10 Therefore, it is possible to evaluate whether and to what extent prices would be
raised on each side of the market as a result of the merger in the absence of efficiency gains.
Readers’ welfare can be calculated using the standard welfare formula for the multinomial
logit model and the estimated parameters,
Wn
(
pnt
)
= ln
1+
J∑
l=1
exp
(
αˆpnlt + ˆξ
n
lt
)  .
Using this equation we can evaluate both consumers welfare using the initially observed prices
10One way to do this is to iterate, i.e. to first solve for the optimal advertising prices of all firms given last itera-
tion’s advertising and subscription prices, then for the optimal subscription prices given last iteration’s advertising
prices, and so on.
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and the prices in the new optimum, and evaluate the welfare change due to the change in prices.
Similarly, advertisers’ welfare can be calculated as
Wa
(
pat , q
n
jt
)
= ln
1+
J∑
l=1
exp
(
γˆpalt + ˆδq
n
lt+
ˆξalt
) .
It is also possible to calculate the change in firm profits due to the merger, under the assumption
that fixed costs are unchanged. However, as surely a merger would eliminate duplication of
some of these fixed costs, the change of producer profits would then be underestimated. Never-
theless, since the merger assessment in the EU follows a consumers’ welfare standard and not
a total welfare standard, this is arguably less of an issue in the present context.
3.3. Efficiency gains
Finally, in case one finds that despite the indirect network effect the merger would tend to
reduce consumer welfare, one could also estimate the size of the (productive) efficiency gains
necessary to counterbalance the post-merger tendency to increase prices and to leave consumer
surplus unchanged.
The efficiency gains which would leave the prices unaffected by the merger can be obtained
as
∆mct =
(
mct − mc
∗
t
)
where the hypothetical lower marginal costs are obtained by subtracting from the pre-merger
price the estimated post merger margins
mc∗t = pt − (pt − mct)PM.
Note these efficiency gains would also leave consumer welfare unchanged on each side of the
market, so that W (pnt )PM = W (pnt ) and W (pat )PM = W (pat ). However, the reverse is not true in
that there might be other combinations of prices which leave consumer welfare unchanged on
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each side.
Alternatively, one might be interested in the efficiency gains that more generally leave the
sum of the two welfares unchanged. These can be obtained as
∆mct =
(
mct − mc
∗
t
)
,
where the hypothetical lower marginal costs mc∗t are obtained by subtracting the estimated post
merger margins from any pre-merger price which would leave total consumers’ welfare un-
changed
mc∗t = pt − (pt − mct)PM
s.t. ∀pt : W
(
pnt
)PM
+W
(
pat
)PM
= W
(
pnt
)
+W
(
pat
)
.
Note that the latter conditions defines a continuum of couples (pnt , pat ).
4. Data
In order to estimate the parameters of interest using market level data, we need data on news-
paper circulation, newspaper prices, the amount of advertising in the respective newspapers,
newspaper specific advertising prices, and the market size for the market for newspapers and
advertising. In principle, it could be useful to have data on additional newspaper characteris-
tics. However, these data are only of value if there is variation in those variables over time,
as we control for time invariant heterogeneity through αnj and αaj , and any characteristic that is
observable but time invariant is thus already controlled for.
In our main specifications, we use quarterly newspaper circulation data from HOI (Het
Oplage Instituut), in particular, we use data on the total circulation, including the free copies.
The vast majority of the circulation for the non-free newspapers, 91% in our data, is paid circu-
lation. We also use annual circulation data on the regional level in a set of robustness checks.
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These data, however, lack information for the free newspapers. In addition, we use quarterly
newspaper subscription prices. This is reasonable because the vast majority of the circulation
consists of subscriptions.
For advertising quantities and spending we use Nielsen data. These data contain advertising
quantity measured in pages and column millimetres, as well as the total advertising spending
and the total number of pages of the respective newspapers. We use the data on the total number
of pages of advertising and the total number of pages to calculate the percentage of advertising
in that newspaper. At any given point in time and per newspaper, the number of pages and
the number of column millimetres are directly related. We use column millimetres when esti-
mating advertising demand because this is the industry standard when it comes to describing
advertising quantities. Finally, from the total spending on advertising and the total number of
column millimetres we can calculate the average price that was spent on a column millimetre
of advertising. This is common practice, but there are several points worth mentioning. Firstly,
total spending is actually generated by Nielsen from list prices. This means that we abstract
from price discounts here. Secondly, the average price that was actually paid is generally not
the same as the price for an average hypothetical advertisement in a newspaper.
Advertising demand is allowed to depend on the characteristics of the readers of a newspa-
per, which we extract from the NOM print monitors. Characteristics are gender, age, wealth,
region, how many readers are bread winners, and how many readers shop for groceries.
In addition, we use three time series, for the total population, the number of households,
and the consumer price index. All three are obtained from CBS (Statistics Netherlands). The
price index is used to deflate prices because only real prices are of interest for readership and
advertising demand. Thus, all prices are deflated by the consumer price index and expressed
in Euros of the third quarter of 1999. The quarterly time series with the population data is
used as a measure of market size. The idea is that every member of the population buys at
most one newspaper. This is an approximation as kids are not expected to buy any newspapers.
Therefore, we also use the number of households in a robustness check. For this, only yearly
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data are available.
5. The Dutch market for daily newspapers
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics on the readership and advertising markets to put
the structural analysis into perspective. In particular, we document that newspaper prices have
increased more than the consumer price index and production costs, that readership demand has
decreased most likely due to the availability of high speed internet access, that the total amount
spent on advertising has remained constant, and that free newspapers have become a serious
competitor to traditional for-pay newspapers.
5.1. Economic environment
It is interesting to compare the evolution of the consumer price index to the evolution of a price
index for newspapers and magazines that was also obtained from CBS. Figure 1 shows that
newspaper and magazine prices have been rising more than twice as much as consumer prices.
Figure 2 shows how newsprint costs evolved until 2007. Unfortunately, these data were not
available for the Netherlands, and therefore we show the FOEX cost measure for Europe, and
the corresponding Italian newsprint costs. The figure suggests that the increase in newsprint
prices as reflected in the previously shown price index for newspapers and magazines was not
driven by increases in printing cost. It also suggests that movements in those costs do not
differ greatly across countries as the Italian index moves in the same way as the European one,
although there is a difference in the levels.
Figure 3 shows indices that are related to cost components, in particular wages and wood
prices. These have been deflated by the consumer price index and normalized to 1 in the first
quarter of the year 2000. We chose this base quarter because this is the first year in which the
collective labour agreement (CAO) wage index for graphic media is available.11 Neither wages
11The CAO wage index is from CBS, the wood price index is the soft wood index for the US and from the IMF,
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Figure 2: Newsprint price indices
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Figure 3: Newsprint costs
nor wood prices caused the high costs around 2001.
An important development for newspapers is that the internet has become more and more
important as a competitor. This is due to the attractiveness of reading news online and is related
to the availability of websites and of high speed internet access. Figure 4 shows the percentage
of households that had a high speed internet connection in the Netherlands.12
5.2. Readership and advertising demand
Figure 5 shows how newspaper circulation changed over time. The top line shows the total
circulation for all newspapers which have circulation data available. These data have been
used to calculate market shares snjt and the share of the outside good. The two lines below that
show total circulation for our sample of newspapers. The sample covers considerably less of
and the minimum wage is from the Ministry of Social Affairs.
12The data on the number of households with high speed internet connection are from the ICT research depart-
ment of the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO). They are yearly until the end of
2006, and quarterly thereafter, and are combined with yearly data on the number of households from CBS.
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Figure 4: Internet usage
the market in terms of circulation because of either missing information on advertisements or
subscription prices. Here, we make an additional distinction between free newspapers and non-
free newspapers to show that the combined market share for paid newspapers has actually been
declining, at least in our estimation sample.
The next figure shows that the total amount spent on advertisements in daily newspapers
actually increased over the study period. This time series is from Nielsen and amounts are in
thousands of (real 3rd quarter of 1999) Euros.
Finally, we look at the evolution of average advertising quantities and prices for our es-
timation sample. Advertising prices are per column millimeter and divided by circulation in
millions. It is meaningful to look at advertising prices per reader once newspapers merge. In
the study period, in September 2005, there has been a big merger between the Algemeene Dag-
blad and Rijn en Gouwe, De Dordtenaar, Rotterdams Dagblad, Haagsche Courant, Utrechts
Nieuwsblad, Goudsche Courant and Amersfoortse Courant. Figure 7 shows that advertising
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Figure 5: Circulation
10
00
00
15
00
00
20
00
00
25
00
00
30
00
00
to
ta
l a
m
ou
nt
 s
pe
nt
 o
n 
ad
s 
in
 d
ai
ly 
ne
ws
pa
pe
rs
1999q3 2002q1 2004q3 2007q1 2009q3
quarter
Data source: Nielsen.
Figure 6: Spending on advertising
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Figure 7: Advertising spending and prices for estimation sample
quantities have stayed roughly the same, while average prices (deflated by the consumer price
index) increased throughout. Here, we calculate a weighted average, where the weights are
proportional to circulation. The vertical line indicates the time of the merger (4th quarter of
2005).
To further investigate the effects of the merger, we now plot the weighted average advertising
price and the weighted average number of pages of advertising against time. This is done for
the group of newspapers merging in 2005. Weights are again proportional to circulation. Figure
8 shows that the average price of advertising has increased at the time of the merger.
Finally, Figure 8 shows that at the same time and for the same group, both circulation and
advertising revenues have decreased over time.
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Figure 8: 2005 merger: spending on advertising and prices
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Figure 9: 2005 merger: weighted spending on advertising and prices
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6. Demand estimates
Table 1 presents readership demand estimates.13 In our baseline specification, (1), we specify
the mean utility from buying a newspaper to depend on the subscription price, the advertising
intensity, and the total number of pages. In addition, we include a linear time trend.
We find the price to have a negative impact on utility. Moreover, we find that the effect
of an increase in advertising intensity does not significantly affect utility, a common finding in
this literature (Argentesi and Filistrucchi, 2007; Fan, 2010, e.g.). However, readers value the
amount of content as measured by the number of pages.
To assess how robust these results are we first use a more flexible time trend in specification
(2) and additionally allow the impact of price to change over time. In particular, we control for
a full set of interactions between newspaper type and quarter dummies. Using this specification,
utility is estimated to depend on price in a positive way.14 This shows that such a specification
is arguably too flexible. The reason for this is that variation in the price of a given newspaper is
used to estimate the dependence of readers’ utility on price, and there is only little such variation
once we control for a flexible time trend and a dependence of price effects on time.
Another concern may be that even after controlling for fixed effects and time trends prefer-
ence shocks εni jt are correlated between newspapers of the same type. We therefore estimate a
nested logit model (see Berry, 1994, for details) by including the log of the within group market
share as additional regressors. The results show that this concern is valid as the coefficient on
this additional variable is significantly different from 1(it is 1 in the standard multinomial logit
model).15 Still, coefficient estimates are similar.
Next, we assess whether our results are sensitive to the choice of the market size. We address
this by using, in specification (4), the number of households instead of the total population as
13Throughout, the number of observations across newspapers and quarters is 775.
14This also holds for the majority of the quarters when we use a simpler linear time trend instead, but allow for
the effect of price on utility to depend on time. The reason is that the coefficient on price is then positive but the
coefficient on the interaction term is negative.
15The coefficient estimate is 0.004 with a standard error of 0.021.
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Table 1: Readership demand parameters (quarterly national level data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
subscription price per quarter in Euros of 1999Q4 -.00804473*** .00004173 -.00803837*** -.00975216 .00271742*
interacted with linear time trend .00007212*
percentage advertising .00014852 -.00023369 .00014918 .00093102* -.00009771
total number of pages .01874337** .01382039* .01858579** .12869453*** .01058924*
linear time trend .00071884 .00074595 .01830889*** -.01078501***
quarter dummies fully interacted with free/regional no yes no no no
log of the within group share .00389189
Notes: This table shows readership demand parameters that were obtained by regressing the difference between the log of the market share and the
log of the market share of the outside good on the explanatory variables in the first column of this table. We also control for newspaper fixed effects.
Specification (1) through (3) use total circulation and the market size is given by the total population. Specification (4) instead uses the number of
households as the market size. In specification (5), we use paid circulation, and the market size is again given by the total population.
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the measure for the market size. The magnitude of the price coefficient is similar to the one
in the other specifications, but the standard error is bigger so that the estimate is no longer
significantly different from zero. Apart from that, the effects of the percentage advertising and
the number of pages are higher, and the effect of advertising is now significantly different from
zero. From this we conclude that our results are indeed somewhat sensitive to the choice of the
market size.
Finally, in specification (5) we assess whether results change when we use total paid cir-
culation instead of total circulation to construct the market share. Obviously, here we have to
exclude the free newspapers. It can be expected that the magnitudes of the effects change since
price is evidently more predictive of paid circulation than it is of total circulation. This is found
here for national newspapers. However, results are unreasonable as price effects are estimated
to be positive (although the effect is only significant at the 10 % level).
Table 2 contains demand estimates that were obtained using regional level data. Here, we
estimate the model on first-differenced data on the regional- and national newspaper level. This
means that we regress changes in the dependent variable for each newspaper within each region
on changes in the explanatory variables. For this we sort the data by region, newspaper, and
year, and then regress changes in the log-difference on changes in the observed characteristics,
respectively. Using these data, the price effect is again estimated to be negative for national
newspapers and positive for regional newspapers. We find a negative dependence of the price
effect on time. Here, we are able to include additional interaction terms between the type
of newspaper because the sample size is bigger. However, we only have circulation data for
national and regional newspapers, therefore the results should be compared to specification (5)
in Table 1. Throughout, the percentage advertising has no significant effect on demand and the
estimated coefficients are similar.
Table 3 contains the results for advertising demand. Our baseline specification relates the
utility of the advertisers to the price of advertising, the circulation, and a linear time trend. We
find negative price effects and positive effects of a higher circulation.
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Table 2: Readership demand parameters (yearly regional level data) data
(1) (2) (3)
subscription price per quarter in Euros of 1999Q4 -.01377033*** -.00635731 -.02037003
interacted with linear time trend -.00242847*** -.00247141*** -.00262318***
interacted with indicator for regional newspaper .04223737 .06104784
percentage advertising .00007554 .00008385 -.00013486
interacted with indicator for regional newspaper -.00066263 -.00011817
total number of pages in thousands .03689737*** .03837949*** .04044864***
interacted with indicator for regional newspaper -.04928149*** -.04778169* -.05136854*
linear time trend -.00910125
interacted with indicator for regional newspaper -.0547944
Notes: This table shows readership demand parameters that were obtained by regressing the difference
between the log of the market share and the log of the market share of the outside good on the explana-
tory variables in the first column of this table. We also control for newspaper fixed effects. We use total
circulation, and the market size is given by the total population.
To assess the robustness of these estimates, in specification (2) we additionally control for
reader characteristics.16 In specification (3), we allow the price effect to depend on time and
additionally control for flexible newspaper type specific time trends. Generally, unlike with
newspaper demand, we don’t find evidence for changing price sensitivity over time. Specifica-
tion (4) is again a nested logit specification, where the nests are once more national, regional,
and free newspapers. The coefficients on the log of the within group share is 0.766 and the price
coefficient is smaller in terms of magnitude.
Overall, price effects differ again across specifications. We picked (1) as our baseline speci-
fication because it is the simplest one that generates the main predictions that are shared by the
other specifications.
7. Merger simulation: an example
For illustration purposes, we analyse the effects of a hypothetical merger between NRC Han-
delsblad, NRC.next, De Telegraaf, Gooi- en Eemlander, Noordhollands Dagblad, and Sp!ts.
As for the parameter vector we use the estimated value δ= 1.4079054 and, also based on the
16The number of observations in specification (1) is 775. Due to missing data on reader characteristics it is 582
in specification (2) through (4).
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Table 3: Advertising demand parameters (quarterly national level data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
advertising price per column millimeter -.02109908 -.01418761 .00223756 -.00094349
interacted with linear time trend .00005125
circulation in million 1.4079054*** 1.4001053*** -.63536502 1.3084028***
linear time trend .00691174*** .00490422* .00107462
percentage male -.34853751 .61748767 -.96418029**
percentage bread winner .22283096 -.11061814 .36703078
percentage grocery shopper population -.13726338 .48378657 -.1494132
percentage three biggest cities 1.4330467*** .98748822** .55192105
percentage North -1.4684984 -2.519561*** -.97898382
percentage East -.51603964 -.23225476 -.18463349
percentage South -1.1714999 -2.7776828*** .12077974
percentage age 35-49 -.00048669 -.46316518 .72672485*
percentage age 50-64 1.1356761** .59822425 .85338151**
percentage age 60+ -.34952494 -1.3083404** .35165916
percentage wealth class 2 and 3 -.43679923 -.88684576*** -.00299449
percentage wealth class 4 and 5 -.34826247 .24492609 -.26313755
quarter dummies fully interacted with free/regional no no yes no
log of the within group share .76551338***
Notes: This table shows advertising demand parameters that were obtained by regressing the difference between the log of the market share and the
log of the market share of the outside good on the explanatory variables in the first column of this table. We also control for newspaper fixed effects.
The market share is given by the number of column millimetres of advertising in particular divided by the total number of column millimetres in all
print media, which defines the market size.
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empirical results, impose β= 0. We set α= 0 and pnjt= 0 for the free newspapers, i.e. they are
assumed to remain free. Besides, we use the market shares, market sizes, prices and ownership
structure of the last quarter of 2009 as the initial situation and perform the SSNIP test for
different combinations of α and γ. For each of those combinations, marginal costs are recovered
from the first-order conditions, as described above.
7.1. SSNIP test
Between the last period in our data, the fourth quarter of 2009, and the time of the hypothetical
merger, PCM (currently De Persgroep Nederland) had to sell NRC Handelsblad andNRC.next.
For the SSNIP test we need to use an observed state with observed prices and quantities as
the initial situation. Therefore, we implement the SSNIP test for a change in the ownership
structure from the situation in the fourth quarter of 2009 to the new situation after the afore-
mentioned newspapers have been sold and NRC Handelsblad and NRC.next have merged with
De Telegraaf, Gooi- en Eemlander, Noordhollands Dagblad, and Sp!ts. Table 6 in Appendix B
shows that for values of γ above -0.2 the marginal costs of an advertisment are negative, which
is clearly unreasonable. Likewise, for values of α above -0.010, the marginal costs of producing
and distributing a copy of a newspaper are estimated to be negative.17
Table 4 shows the results of the SSNIP test. The details on the implementation have been
given above. A number in that table is the percentage change in profits due to a 5% increase
in the price of the merging parties, with optimal adjustment of the advertising prices only by
the merging parties. The table shows that for all reasonable combinations of the parameters, as
argued above, a price increase by 5% on the subscriptions market has no economically relevant
effect on profits. The reason for this is that advertising prices and market shares in the newspaper
market hardly change.
17The threshold value for the mark-up to become negative on the readership side depends on the size of the
network effect. In order to quantify the dependence we have tripled the parameter δ, thereby tripling the elasticity
of advertising demand with respect to the number of subscriptions. We find that the dependence on the network
effect is not too big, justifying the approach we take here, namely to only alter the two parameters α and γ.
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Table 4: SSNIP test
γ -1.000 -0.500 -0.333 -0.250 -0.200
-0.050 -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.004
-0.025 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004
α -0.017 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
-0.013 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003
-0.010 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
Notes: This table shows the percentage change in profits due to a
5% change in subscription prices. Shown for different combinations
of α and γ. Calculated for β = 0 and δ= 1.4079054 and the mar-
ket shares, market sizes, prices and ownership structure of the last
quarter of 2009.
7.2. Full merger simulation
Table 7 in Appendix B summarizes the effects of the merger on prices, market shares, and
profits. This table is for α= −0.017 and γ=-0.333. The second column in that table indicates
whether the newspaper was in the product portfolio of one of the merging parties. The main
effect of the merger is a price increase in the newspapers owned by the merging parties. How-
ever, there is no substantial effect on market shares, and hence not on the advertising market.
This is because advertising prices and market shares only depend on the market shares of the
newspaper market, but not on subscription prices.
Finally, Table 5 summarizes the effects of the merger on prices, market shares and profits.
Generally, the effects are bigger for prices and market shares of the merging newspapers, but still
relatively small. The last two columns report results when we ignore that advertising demand
depends on circulation, i.e. when we set δ = 0. The effect of this turns out to be small.
8. Summary and conclusions
We develop a structural econometric framework that allows to simulate the unilateral (or non-
coordinated effects) of mergers among two-sided platforms selling differentiated products. This
framework is general enough to allow for different demand specifications on both sides of the
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Table 5: Summary merger simulation
correct specification ignoring network effect
merged others merged others
subscription price 4.0% 0.0% 3.9% 0.0%
readership market share -3.3% 0.3% -3.2% 0.2%
advertising price 1.4% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0%
advertising market share -2.3% 0.1% -1.4% 0.0%
profits 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2%
Notes: This table shows the average percentage change in subscription prices, the read-
ership market share, advertising price, and advertising market share. The average is
taken across newspapers, with equal weight. Profits are summed across all profits and
then the percentage change is reported. Reported separately for merging newspapers
and others. The last two columns are the results when the network effect is ignored, i.e.
when δ = 0 is imposed.
market. Although we discuss the case of price competition, the methodology can be easily
extended to the case of platforms competition on quantities on both sides or to the case of
competition in prices on one side and competition in quantities on the other.18
We apply the proposed framework to the Dutch newspaper industry. Our structural model
encompasses demands for differentiated products on both sides of the market and profit maxi-
mization by competing oligopolistic publishers who choose subscription and advertising prices,
while taking into account that advertisers willingness to pay for an ad increases with the news-
paper circulation.
We therefore estimate demand on each side of the market using a logit specification. We
estimate the sign and size of the indirect network effects between the two sides of the market.
We find that whereas a higher readership is associated with a higher demand for advertising,
a higher level of advertising does not lead neither to a decline nor to a rise in readership. So
that readers would seem to be on average indifferent to advertising. The finding is in line with
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) for the Dutch daily newspapers market and with those of Fan
(2010) for the US daily newspapers market. We therefore proceed under the assumption that
advertising has no effect on circulation.
18The case of price competition among two-sided platforms has always been recognized as the most difficult
one to address due to the feedback loop it may generate.
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We then use the estimated parameters and our theoretical model to simulate the effects of
a hypothetical merger on prices and welfare. The results of the merger simulation indicate
that in our case the projected effects of the merger on prices are generally lower once the two-
sidedness of the market is taken into account. This is consistent with the newspaper market
being characterized by a positive indirect network effect of readership on advertising demand.
Since raising the newspaper price is likely to lead not only to a loss in readers but also to a loss
in advertising, the post-merger tendency to increase prices will be lower. Overall, in our case,
the effects of the hypothetical merger on prices and welfare are found to be small.
Appendix A: Formulas for markups when there are two
indirect network effects
In Section 3, we made the simplifying assumption that readers are indifferent with respect to
advertising quantity in their newspaper. This is a common assumption that is supported by the
empirical literature on daily newspapers and, more importantly, our empirical results. Never-
theless, in this appendix, we show how one can recover marginal costs without making this
assumption.
We still assume that firm f maximizes profits by choosing advertising prices pajt and sub-
scription prices pnjt for all newspapers j in their newspaper portfolio F f . That is, it maximizes
Π f t=
∑
l∈F f
{(
palt−mc
a
lt
)
Mat salt+
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)
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)
.
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i.e. knowing how the market share in the advertising market depends on the vector of all ad-
vertising prices, pat , and the vector of all readership demands, qnt , and how the market share in
the subscriptions market depends on the vector of all subscription prices, pnt , and all advertising
quantities, qat .
As already noted, this is a non-linear system of 2J equations in 2J unknowns. Were it linear
or log-linear we could obtain expressions for the quantities qnt and qat as explicit functions of the
prices pnt and pat :
qnt =M
n
t ŝ
n
t
(
pnt , p
a
t
)
qat =M
a
t ŝ
a
t
(
pat , p
n
t
)
.
Notice that here, we denote these functions with hats. Using them, one could rewrite the profit
function of firm f as
Π f t=
∑
l∈F f
{(
palt−mc
a
lt
)
Mat ŝat
(
pat , p
n
t
)
+
(
pnlt−mc
n
lt
)
Mn ŝnt
(
pnt , p
a
t
)}
.
The first-order conditions ∂Π f t
∂pajt
= 0 and ∂Π f t
∂pnjt
= 0, involve the following derivatives of quantities on
the two-sides of the market with respect to prices:19
∂qajt
∂pakt
=Ma ·
∂ŝajt
∂pakt
∂qnjt
∂pnkt
=Mn ·
∂ŝnjt
∂pnkt
∂qajt
∂pakt
=Ma ·
∂ŝajt
∂pakt
∂qnjt
∂pnkt
=Mn ·
∂ŝnjt
∂pnkt
.
19Note that ∂sˆajt/∂p
a
kt are now total derivatives that account for the network effect, whereas in Section 3 ∂s
a
jt/∂p
a
kt
were partial derivatives that did not account for the network effect.
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Using those, one can write the first-order conditions as
Masajt+
∑
l∈F f
(
palt−mc
a
lt
)
Ma
∂ŝalt
∂pajt
+
∑
l∈F f
(
pnlt−mc
n
lt
)
Mn
∂ŝnlt
∂pajt
= 0
and
Mnsnjt+
∑
l∈F f
(
pnlt−mc
n
lt
)
Mn
∂ŝnlt
∂pnjt
+
∑
k∈F f
(
palt−mc
a
lt
)
Ma
∂ŝalt
∂pnjt
= 0
for j= 1, . . . , J.
The derivatives ∂ŝ
a
jt
∂pakt
,
∂ŝnjt
∂pnkt
.
∂ŝajt
∂pakt
,
∂ŝnjt
∂pnkt
can be obtained using the implicit function theorem. For
this, we define the following matrix we wish to obtain
Ŝ=

Ŝ nn Ŝ an
Ŝ na Ŝ aa
 ,
where the block Ŝ aa is the matrix of marginal effects of advertising prices on advertising de-
mand, Ŝ an a matrix of marginal effects of advertising prices on newspaper demand, Ŝ nn is a
matrix of marginal effects of subscription prices on newspaper demand, and Ŝ an a matrix of
marginal effects of subscription prices on newspaper demand, so that
Ŝ aajk=
∂ŝajt
∂pakt
Ŝ nnjk=
∂ŝnjt
∂pnkt
.
Ŝ najk=
∂ŝajt
∂pakt
Ŝ anjk=
∂ŝnjt
∂pnkt
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Define also the matrix
B =

−I Nan
Nna −I
 ,
where Nna is a matrix of externalities of readership on advertising and Nan is a matrix of exter-
nalities of advertising on readership (the one we assume to be equal to zero in the main text),
such that
Nnajk =
∂sajt
∂qnkt
Nanjk =
∂snjt
∂qakt
.
Finally, define the matrix
S =

S n 0
0 S a
 ,
where, as in the main text, S a, is a matrix of marginal effects of advertising prices on advertising
demand and S n is a matrix of marginal effects of subscription prices on newspaper demand.
By the implicit function theorem,
Ŝ=

Ŝ nn Ŝ an
Ŝ na Ŝ aa
= B−1S =

−I Nan
Nna −I


S n 0
0 S a
 ,
which shows that such derivatives exist if the matrix B is non-singular and therefore invertible.
One can then define, as before, a Nevo (2001)-type ownership matrix Ω∗, such that Ω∗jr =
1 i f products j and r are owned by the same f irm, 0 otherwise, and also define interactions be-
tween those and the ownership matrix, ΩS na , ΩS an , ΩS aa and ΩS nn , such that:
Ω̂
S aa
jr =Ω
∗
jr · Ŝ
aa
jr
Ω̂S
nn
jr =Ω
∗
jr · Ŝ
nn
jr
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Ω̂
S an
jr =Ω
∗
jr · Ŝ
an
jr
Ω̂
S na
jr =Ω
∗
jr · Ŝ
na
jr
Using these one can rewrite the first-order conditions as
sa+Ω̂
S aa (pa−mca)+Ω̂S an (pn−mcn)= 0
and
sn+Ω̂
S nn (pn−mcn)+Ω̂S na (pa−mca)= 0,
where, as before, sa, sn, pn, pa, mcn, and mca are all J × 1 vectors of market shares, prices, and
marginal costs for newspapers and advertisements, respectively.
To solve this system of equations for the unknown (pat −mcat ) and (pnt −mcnt ) define
Ω̂=

Ω̂S
aa
Ω̂S
an
Ω̂S
na
Ω̂S
nn
 ,
st=

sat
snt

and
(pt−mct)=

pat −mcat
pnt −mcnt
 .
Using this we can write the first-order conditions as
st+Ω̂ · (pt−mct)= 0
and solve for
(pt−mct)= −Ω̂−1st.
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Finally, one can obtain marginal costs by subtracting the estimated mark-ups from the observed
prices, as
mct= pt− (pt−mct) .
Appendix B: Additional tables
Table 6: Price elasticities and ratio of marginal cost to price for different parameter combina-
tions
α -1/20 -1/40 -1/60 -1/80 -1/100
subscription price elasticity -3.298 -1.649 -1.099 -0.824 -0.660
subscription marginal cost/price (γ = −1) 0.758 0.474 0.19 -0.094 -0.377
subscription marginal cost/price (γ = −0.5) 0.784 0.5 0.217 -0.067 -0.351
subscription marginal cost/price (γ = −1/3) 0.811 0.527 0.243 -0.041 -0.324
subscription marginal cost/price (γ = −1/4) 0.837 0.553 0.27 -0.014 -0.298
subscription marginal cost/price (γ = −1/5) 0.864 0.58 0.296 0.012 -0.272
γ -1 -1/2 -1/3 -1/4 -1/5
advertising price elasticity -5.173 -2.587 -1.724 -1.293 -1.035
advertising marginal cost/price 0.803 0.606 0.409 0.212 0.015
Notes: This table shows price elasticities and ratio of marginal cost to price for different combinations of α
and γ. Calculated for β = 0 and δ= 1.4079054 and the market shares, market sizes, prices and ownership
structure of the last quarter of 2009.
M
ergerSim
ulation
in
a
T
w
o
-Sided
M
ark
et
40
Table 7: Effects of hypothetical merger
pn sn pa sa Π
newspaper merged before after before after before after before after before after
De Telegraaf yes 66.969 68.463 0.0419 0.0410 11.945 11.965 0.0109 0.0106 45343586 45369030
Gooi- en Eemlander yes 68.932 70.261 0.0017 0.0016 0.634 0.654 0.0063 0.0063 6482457 6485351
Noordhollands Dagblad yes 68.943 70.203 0.0084 0.0082 2.552 2.572 0.0074 0.0074 13599035 13609058
NRC Handelsblad yes 85.164 89.967 0.0129 0.0119 6.399 6.489 0.0052 0.0049 15741387 15718898
NRC.next yes 51.888 56.310 0.0054 0.0050 3.496 3.586 0.0018 0.0017 6619551 6613221
Sp!ts yes 0.000 0.000 0.0207 0.0207 9.255 9.275 0.0049 0.0049 359284 357090
Algemeen Dagblad no 69.230 69.226 0.0273 0.0273 15.942 15.942 0.0058 0.0058 30277740 30356211
Barneveldse Krant no 50.402 50.399 0.0007 0.0007 0.361 0.361 0.0041 0.0041 3714741 3718814
Dagblad van het Noorden no 66.504 66.497 0.0085 0.0085 2.933 2.933 0.0114 0.0114 15848734 15878292
De Gelderlander no 70.801 70.798 0.0090 0.0090 5.042 5.042 0.0075 0.0075 13873539 13902134
de Volkskrant no 75.325 75.326 0.0154 0.0155 6.936 6.936 0.0049 0.0049 18613479 18658704
Financieele Dagblad no 135.751 135.749 0.0038 0.0038 5.871 5.871 0.0022 0.0022 5283726 5294856
Het Parool no 68.814 68.820 0.0054 0.0055 2.562 2.562 0.0051 0.0051 9067812 9085620
Metro no 0.000 0.000 0.0279 0.0279 16.221 16.221 0.0040 0.0040 -1624025 -1628788
Nederlands Dagblad no 78.801 78.800 0.0018 0.0018 0.656 0.656 0.0015 0.0015 2827445 2832904
PZC no 69.248 69.250 0.0033 0.0033 1.708 1.708 0.0080 0.0081 9215325 9229012
Reformatorisch Dagblad no 72.452 72.449 0.0032 0.0033 0.821 0.821 0.0038 0.0038 5818748 5829291
Stentor no 70.750 70.749 0.0079 0.0079 4.482 4.482 0.0069 0.0069 12516551 12541844
Trouw no 81.332 81.339 0.0064 0.0064 3.067 3.067 0.0027 0.0027 8432412 8451431
Twentsche Courant Tubantia no 68.200 68.199 0.0068 0.0068 2.996 2.996 0.0075 0.0075 11951717 11974528
Notes: This table shows the effects of a hypothetical merger. Calculated for α= −0.017 , β = 0, γ= − 0.333 and δ= 1.4079054. The initial situation is
characterized by the market shares, market sizes, prices and ownership structure of the last quarter of 2009.
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